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RESPONSE
Implicit Racial Bias and the Perpetrator
Perspective: A Response to
Reasonable but Unconstitutional
L. Song Richardson*
In their Article, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and
the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, Professor Chin and Mr.
Vernon not only provide a withering critique of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
unanimous decision in Whren v. United States but they also present novel
doctrinal arguments for reversing its problematic dicta that racial discrimina-
tion is constitutionally reasonable.  Their arguments are compelling and re-
quire no extension of current doctrine.  For instance, Chin and Vernon
embrace Whren’s endorsement of pretextual traffic stops as long as those
stops do not involve racial profiling.  Additionally, the authors implicitly em-
brace a central premise of the Court’s current race jurisprudence, which is that
only conscious racism violates the Constitution.  Thus, their framework allows
the Court to reach the identical outcome in Whren, without sanctioning race-
based policing.  This Response argues, however, that there are some disadvan-
tages to relying upon the Court’s existing jurisprudence when questions of race
are concerned.  First, their defense of pretextual policing is troubling because
the practice likely will exacerbate the racial burdens that non-Whites experi-
ence at the hands of the police, even if conscious racial bias is nonexistent.
Furthermore, focusing solely on officers’ subjective racial motivations to de-
termine whether discrimination has occurred ignores the victims’ experiences
* Professor, University of California, Irvine, School of Law.  J.D., The Yale Law School;
A.B., Harvard College.  I wish to thank Sierra Nelson and Ariela Rutkin-Becker for excellent
research assistance.  I am also grateful to Gwendelynn Bills, Brentley Smith, Dane Shikman,
Nathalie Baker, Thaddeus Ewald and other members of The George Washington Law Review
for their work editing this Response.  All errors are my own.
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of profiling.  In sum, the Court’s current conception of race discrimination is
anemic and in urgent need of reform.  Chin’s and Vernon’s arguments in-
crease the likelihood that the Court will condemn racial discrimination as un-
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  This would mark an important
first step towards moving the Court to adopt a more realistic and broader
conception of the harms of race discrimination.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. United States1 is infa-
mous for its failure to denounce racial profiling.  Rather, the unani-
mous Court held that subjective motivations, even those based upon
racial animus, cannot “invalidate[ ] objectively justifiable behavior
under the Fourth Amendment.”2  The decision has garnered wide-
spread criticism for allowing officers to use probable cause of a traffic
violation as a pretext for stopping individuals based upon racially mo-
tivated suspicions of criminality.3
In their Article, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling
and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States,4 Professor
Gabriel “Jack” Chin and Mr. Charles Vernon not only provide a with-
ering critique of Whren’s unfortunate and influential statements that
racial discrimination is constitutionally reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment but they also present novel doctrinal arguments for re-
1 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
2 Id. at 812.
3 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946,
1033 (2002); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 442
(1997); David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 545–46 (1997); Tracey
Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 340 (1998); Anthony C.
Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
956, 981–82 (1999).
4 Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable But Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling
and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882 (2015).
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versing this problematic dicta.5  Given the sheer amount of scholar-
ship critical of Whren that exists, this is a remarkable achievement.
In his prior scholarship, Professor Chin has been extraordinarily
successful in influencing courts through his thoughtful, thorough, and
careful analysis of doctrine.  He has the uncanny ability to see rela-
tionships that other scholars have overlooked.  Additionally, because
he often bases his novel arguments on current doctrine, his scholar-
ship has been persuasive to judges and cited in numerous decisions,
including one of the Supreme Court’s recent groundbreaking opin-
ions.6  In their Article, Professor Chin and Mr. Vernon continue this
tradition and utilize the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence to
demonstrate convincingly that there is no basis for legitimizing race
discrimination under the Fourth Amendment.
One of their novel and ingenious arguments focuses on the
Court’s statement in Whren that the Fourth Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause are distinct.  Chin
and Vernon point out that in making this claim, the Court ignored its
own precedents holding that the Fourth Amendment governs the con-
duct of state officials only because of its incorporation in the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7  Hence, the Court is
necessarily saying not that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment are distinct but
rather “that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause [are] distinct.”8
Yet, this is nonsensical because the Court has read both clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting race discrimination.  Thus, it is
5 Id. at 886.
6 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010) (citing Gabriel J. Chin & Richard
W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 COR-
NELL L. REV. 697, 713–18 (2002)); United States v. Valdovinos, 760 F.3d 322, 333 (4th Cir. 2014)
(Davis, J., dissenting) (citing Jeff Yates, Todd A. Collins & Gabriel J. Chin, A War on Drugs or a
War on Immigrants?  Expanding the Definition of “Drug Trafficking” in Determining Aggravated
Felon Status for Noncitizens, 64 MD. L. REV. 875, 880–81 (2005)); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d
24, 58 n.38 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., dissenting) (citing Gabriel J. Chin, Are Collateral Sanc-
tions Premised on Conduct or Conviction?: The Case of Abortion Doctors, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1685, 1686 (2003)); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 351 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (Parker, J., dis-
senting) (citing Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote:
Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259
(2004)).
7 Chin & Vernon, supra note 4, at 919–26.  Another obvious mistake that the Court made R
in its analysis is that because the District of Columbia is not a state, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause does not apply. Id. at 919.
8 Id. at 920 (emphasis omitted).
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“untenable” to hold that the Due Process Clause “simultaneously pro-
hibits and is indifferent to discrimination.”9
Second, Chin and Vernon argue that what is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment must be informed by other constitutional provi-
sions because the Constitution should be read as a whole.10  The Court
has embraced this conception of the Constitution in other cases.11
Furthermore, the Court has “consistently articulated . . . that unconsti-
tutional behavior is unreasonable.”12  Thus, since race discrimination
is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
and Equal Protection clauses, it should also be unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.
Third, Chin and Vernon contend that even if the reasonableness
clause of the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit discrimination, the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine would require suppression of any
evidence obtained as a result of a search or seizure motivated by ra-
cism.13  This is because race discrimination violates another core con-
stitutional provision, namely the Equal Protection Clause.  Thus,
“given that Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amend-
ment, and Fourteenth Amendment due process violations can result in
suppression of the fruits of otherwise valid searches or interrogations,
it seems reasonable that Fourteenth Amendment equal protection vi-
olations should as well.”14
Fourth, Chin and Vernon emphasize that the Court’s rationales
for rejecting inquiry into officers’ subjective motivations are purely
prudential.15  Two of the prudential rationales are consistent with
prohibiting race discrimination, namely holding law enforcement to
high standards of conduct and promoting even-handed law enforce-
ment.16  The final reason is judicial economy, and, as they argue,
surely discovering and eliminating racism cannot be considered a
“‘grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources.’”17  This is es-
pecially so given that the Court has not consistently eschewed inquiry
into subjective motivations throughout its Fourth Amendment juris-
9 Id. at 918.
10 Id. at 927–32.
11 Id. at 929–30.
12 Id. at 930.
13 Id. at 932–35.
14 Id. at 934.
15 Id. at 906–12.
16 Id. at 906–10.
17 Id. at 910 (quoting Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
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prudence.  In fact, a “critical, directly relevant category of cases where
the Supreme Court has held that it is appropriate to examine subjec-
tive motivation are those involving an otherwise valid search chal-
lenged as resting on an independent illegality or wrong.”18
Additionally, Chin and Vernon draw attention to the fact that the
Court has allowed inquiry into officers’ racial motivations when doing
so is helpful to establish probable cause or reasonable suspicion.19
Thus, since “evidence of racial motivation is perfectly admissible when
it helps the prosecution’s case, . . . there is only one reason not to
allow inquiry into racial motivation when it helps the defendant: that
the Court has a special disfavor of claims of racial discrimination.”20
With these powerful arguments, Chin and Vernon use the Court’s
existing jurisprudence to make a compelling case that racism is unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment, that the products of searches
motivated by racial animus should be suppressed, and that inquiry
into officers’ subjective motivations is appropriate during suppression
hearings.  Because their elegant analysis fits comfortably within pre-
vailing doctrine, there is reason for optimism that the Court will adopt
their arguments and reject Whren’s problematic dicta.
There are, however, some disadvantages to relying upon the
Court’s existing jurisprudence when questions of race are concerned.
This is demonstrated by Chin and Vernon’s argument that the Court
could have reached the identical outcome in Whren, without sanction-
ing race-based policing, by using the Oyler v. Boles21 framework.22
In Oyler, the Court “applied equal protection principles to estab-
lish the rule that prosecutors are free to bring charges supported by
probable cause for any reason, except that they may not charge based
on race, religion, or other unconstitutional considerations.”23  Using
this framework, Chin and Vernon assert that, provided racism does
not motivate an officer’s conduct, “there is no Fourth Amendment
problem in stopping a driver based on probable cause of a traffic vio-
lation in hopes that the stop will lead to evidence or a statement about
a wholly unrelated crime.”24 In other words, the authors embrace pre-
text stops as long as these stops do not involve racial profiling.  Fur-
thermore, in addition to defending Whren’s endorsement of pretextual
18 Id. at 914.
19 Id. at 940–41.
20 Id. at 941.
21 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
22 Chin & Vernon, supra note 4, at 888. R
23 Id.
24 Id. at 884.
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traffic stops, Chin and Vernon implicitly embrace a central premise of
the Court’s current race jurisprudence—that only conscious racism vi-
olates the Constitution.25
From a purely instrumental perspective, these arguments make
sense.  Their goal of convincing the Court to overrule Whren’s prob-
lematic dicta in the next appropriate case is facilitated if the Court can
decide Whren “the same way, but without the unnecessary ruling that
race discrimination was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment.”26  The authors highlight the fact that
[i]f the Court adopt[s] Oyler as the rule for police as well as
prosecution discretion, broad categories of heretofore per-
missible forms of police conduct would not be called into
question.  The only issues now submerged in the objective
test that would become cognizable are forms of discrimina-
tion that are already prohibited by other provisions of the
Constitution.27
Importantly, their argument that conscious racial profiling is un-
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is completely persuasive.
So too is their argument that it is consistent with existing precedent to
allow inquiry into officers’ subjective motivations to uncover race dis-
crimination.  If Chin and Vernon are able to convince the Court to
create a bright-line rule that race discrimination is unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, this will be a groundbreaking and important
achievement.
As discussed below, however, their embrace of pretextual polic-
ing is troubling because the practice likely will exacerbate the racial
burdens that individuals of color experience at the hands of the police,
even if conscious racial bias is nonexistent.  Furthermore, focusing
solely on officers’ subjective racial motivations to determine whether
discrimination has occurred, what Devon Carbado has termed the
“perpetrator perspective,”28 ignores the victims’ experiences of profil-
ing.  Thus, the perpetrator perspective misapprehends the harm of
race discrimination, which occurs regardless of whether a malicious
racial actor exists.29
25 See id. at 888–89.
26 Id. at 889.
27 Id. at 915–16.
28 Carbado, supra note 3, at 968. R
29 For articles critiquing the Supreme Court’s intent requirement, see Barbara J. Flagg,
“Was Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory
Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 958 (1993); Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited:
Reflections on the Impact and Origins of “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection”, 40 CONN. L.
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I. PRETEXT STOPS
Pretext stops allow officers to use traffic violations as a cover to
act on their suspicions of criminality in the absence of reasonable sus-
picion or probable cause.30  In support of their argument that pretext
is defensible, Chin and Vernon highlight that officers often consider
factors unrelated to the interest of enforcing traffic regulations in de-
ciding whether or not to stop a driver.31  For instance, officers may
stop vehicles to boost their numbers after being reprimanded for be-
ing lazy or to train new recruits on how to conduct traffic stops.32
Thus, Chin and Vernon conclude,
[i]f police may consider matters which have no relation to
the culpability or the conduct of the defendant in determin-
ing who to investigate (such as public concerns about partic-
ular types of crimes or the officer’s own reputation), then it
is not clear why they could not also consider potential of-
fenses committed by the motorist in determining who to
stop.33
In their view, as long as conscious racial animus is nonexistent, pretext
stops are justifiable.  Pretextual policing, however, will facilitate race-
based policing even in the absence of conscious bias because of the
influence of implicit racial bias on officer judgments.
REV. 931, 946 (2008) (making the point that under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, “because
the defendants were not intentional racists, no constitutional violation had occurred, even
though the facts showed dramatic racial inequality”); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111,
1136–37 (1997); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the
Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 326 (“[C]hallenges to discriminatory police prac-
tices [under the Equal Protection Clause] will fail without proof of conscious racial animus on
the part of the police.”).
30 Others have more fully discussed why the Fourth Amendment should prohibit pretex-
tual conduct and I will not repeat those arguments here. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 433–39 (1974) (discussing pre-
text); James B. Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 639, 641–43 (1985); Harris, supra note 3, at 554–59; Barbara C. Salken, The Gen- R
eral Warrant of the Twentieth Century?  A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion
to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221, 257–58 (1989) (noting that traffic laws
provide the twentieth century equivalent of the general warrant); Sklansky, supra note 29, at 329 R
(“[A] Fourth Amendment jurisprudence more alert to minority interests and experiences proba-
bly would find room for a rule disallowing pretextual detentions for traffic violations . . . .”).
31 Chin & Vernon, supra note 4, at 898–900. R
32 See id. at 898.
33 Id. at 899.
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A. Implicit Racial Bias
Copious evidence demonstrates that police disproportionately
stop Black and Latino drivers despite the fact that those populations
do not commit traffic offenses at significantly higher rates than
Whites.34  Often the assumption is that this results from conscious and
intentional racial profiling, and it is certainly true that officers engage
in this conduct.35  Individuals of color, however, will continue to bear
the brunt of pretextual policing even in the absence of conscious bias
because of the effect of implicit racial biases on officer judgments of
criminality and suspicion.36
The phrase “implicit racial bias” refers to the influence of uncon-
scious stereotypes (beliefs) and attitudes (feelings) about racial groups
on our judgments and behaviors.37  For instance, research consistently
demonstrates that most people unconsciously associate Blacks with
criminality, even if this association conflicts with their consciously
held beliefs.38  This implicit association exists in our minds because we
are constantly exposed to it in our society.  Over three decades of re-
search regularly demonstrates that these implicit biases, once acti-
vated, can negatively influence our behaviors towards and judgments
of people of color in ways we are unaware of and often cannot
control.39
34 See Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian
Review Boards, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551, 560, 562–65 (1997) (discussing statistical
studies); Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 199, 209 & n.58 (2007); see also CHRIS KOSTER, MO. ATT’Y GEN., 2013 ANNUAL
REPORT: MISSOURI VEHICLE STOPS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 (2014), available at https://
ago.mo.gov/docs/default-source/public-safety/2013analysisbykoster.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (noting that
“African-Americans were 66 percent more likely than whites to be stopped based on their re-
spective proportions of the Missouri driving-age population in 2013”); JACK MCDEVITT ET AL.,
NORTHEASTERN U. INST. ON RACE & JUST., RHODE ISLAND TRAFFIC STOP STATISTICS DATA
COLLECTION STUDY: INITIAL FINDINGS REPORT, at iii (2014), available at http://
www.northeastern.edu/irj/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/RI-Traffic-Stop-Statistics-Data-Collection
-Study-Executive-Summary-1.13.2014.pdf (noting that “in 23 communities in Rhode Island, non-
white residents were more likely to be stopped than census data would have suggested”).
35 See, e.g., Hecker, supra note 34, at 566 & n.74. R
36 See id. at 586.
37 See L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV.
2035, 2042–43, 2053 (2011).
38 See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 878 (2004); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming
Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 485
(2004); Kristin A. Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 433 (2007); Sophie Trawalter et al., Attending to Threat: Race-
Based Patterns of Selective Attention, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1322, 1322 (2008).
39 See Lane, supra note 38, at 444. R
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There is ample reason for concern that implicit racial biases will
have pernicious effects on police officers’ judgments of Blacks.40  In
the discussion that follows, I will focus on the influence of these im-
plicit biases as they pertain to the Black community because the scien-
tific literature is most developed in this area.
First, these biases flourish in situations where individuals make
decisions based upon limited information.41  This is precisely the situa-
tion that exists when officers are acting on hunches of criminality that
do not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion or probable cause—in
other words, when they are engaged in pretext stops.  For instance,
research demonstrates that when officers are asked to interpret am-
biguous evidence, implicit biases negatively affect their judgments.  In
one study, police officers concluded that a male juvenile’s ambiguous
behaviors were more culpable and more deserving of severe punish-
ment when implicit racial biases were activated.42  In another, officers
were more likely to see weapons in the hands of unarmed Black indi-
viduals than in the hands of unarmed White individuals as a result of
implicit bias.43
These findings are consistent with a classic study showing that ra-
cial stereotypes can cause individuals to evaluate ambiguous actions
performed by Black individuals with more suspicion than identical ac-
tions performed by White individuals.44  In this study, individuals were
asked to rate an ambiguous shove as aggressive or horsing around.
Researchers found that the race of the actors affected how the sub-
jects rated the shove.  For instance, when both actors were White, only
thirteen percent evaluated the behavior as aggressive.45  But when
both actors were Black, sixty-nine percent of the subjects rated the
shove as aggressive.46
The second reason implicit biases are likely to influence officers is
that officers are constantly on the lookout for criminality.  Problemati-
40 For a more in-depth discussion, see Richardson, supra note 37, at 2042–52; L. Song R
Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1148–51 (2012).
41 Graham & Lowery, supra note 38, at 486–87. R
42 Id.
43 Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity To Disambiguate
Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1327 (2002); see
also B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CUR-
RENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 287–88 (2006).
44 Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence:
Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590,
596–97 (1976).
45 Id. at 595.
46 Id.
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cally, research demonstrates that simply thinking about crime is suffi-
cient to trigger implicit racial biases in police officers.47  This is
believed to occur because the association between Blacks and crime is
so well rehearsed that it has become bidirectional—thoughts of crime
unconsciously activate thoughts of Blacks, and, reciprocally, thoughts
of Blacks activate thoughts of crime.48  Researchers discovered that
this association led officers to pay more attention to Black faces than
to White faces,49 a form of unconscious racial profiling. .
B. Officer Judgments of Suspicion
Importantly, Chin and Vernon do not endorse racial profiling.
They argue that all pretext stops, whether they are based upon race,
sex, sexual orientation or religion, are unjustifiable.  Thus, in making
their argument in support of pretextual policing, they ask the reader
to “put[ ] aside the possibility of selection based on race . . . [and]
imagine for simplicity that there is no possibility of discrimination.”50
The problem is that given the ubiquity of implicit racial bias, it is im-
possible to set aside the possibility of selection based on race.  Be-
cause officers are on the lookout for criminal activity, they are likely
steeped in unconscious Black stereotypes that will influence their
judgments of suspicion.
Consider one of the examples given by Chin and Vernon.  They
argue that “it should not be objectionable to select from among all
speeders those who demonstrate indicia, falling short of reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, of drunk driving.”51  If we extend this
argument to allow officers to stop individuals who are speeding in or-
der to investigate possible drug dealing, we have the facts of Whren.
In that case, the officers were on patrol for criminal activity.52  As the
research demonstrates, thinking about crime is sufficient to activate
unconscious bias, which can lead to increased scrutiny of young, Black
men.  This can explain why Whren’s vehicle drew the officers’ atten-
tion even if the officers were not engaged in conscious racial profiling.
Once their attention was captured, the officers noticed the male
driver looking at his passenger’s lap while they were stopped at a stop
sign.53  There is nothing inherently suspicious or criminal about this
47 See Eberhardt et al., supra note 38, at 883. R
48 Id.
49 See id.
50 Chin & Vernon, supra note 4, at 896–97. R
51 Id. at 899.
52 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996).
53 Id.
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behavior.  Had the occupants been White, the officers may not have
noticed the behavior or may not have thought twice about it.  How-
ever, because of the strong implicit association between Blacks and
crime and because young, Black men serve as the conscious and un-
conscious mental prototype of drug dealers,54 it is unsurprising that
the officers developed a gut feeling that this behavior was suspicious.
Again, setting aside the possibility of conscious bias, implicit racial
bias can also explain why these ambiguous behaviors aroused the of-
ficers’ suspicions. Once this occurred, it was relatively simple to find a
traffic violation to use as a pretext to stop the vehicle and conduct a
drug investigation unsupported by reasonable suspicion or probable
cause.55  Thus, even in the absence of conscious profiling, race can in-
fluence pretextual traffic stops.
The probable effect of implicit bias on pretext stops is not limited
to the initial decision to stop the vehicle.  Chin and Vernon give an-
other example of a pretext stop involving a suspected residential bur-
glar who escapes in a blue 2005 Honda Accord.56  They argue that “a
possibility falling short of reasonable suspicion that the motorist has
committed a burglary should not immunize the motorist from being
stopped.”57  Hence, they contend that using traffic offenses to stop all
cars matching this description in an attempt to catch the burglar is
legitimate.58
If officers actually stop all cars matching this description, then
implicit bias will not influence the decision because officers are not
exercising any discretion.  These biases, however, are likely to influ-
ence discretionary decisions that occur after the stop, such as whether
to issue a ticket, arrest the driver, seek consent to search, or bring a
drug dog to the scene.  Again, implicit biases can still influence of-
ficers’ judgments of suspicion in ways that will burden Blacks more
than Whites even when officers are not engaged in conscious profiling.
Thus, pretext stops will continue to undercut the privacy rights of
individuals of color, even in the absence of conscious bias.  People of
color will be stopped more often because implicit biases will likely
54 See Trawalter et al., supra note 38, at 1322. R
55 See Harris, supra note 3, at 545 (“In the most literal sense, no driver can avoid violating R
some traffic law during a short drive, even with the most careful attention.”); Sklansky, supra
note 29, at 273 (“Since virtually everyone violates traffic laws at least occasionally, the upshot of R
[the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Cases] is that police officers, if they are patient, can
eventually pull over almost anyone they choose . . . .”).
56 Chin & Vernon, supra note 4, at 899. R
57 Id.
58 Id. at 899–901.
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influence how the police interpret their ambiguous behaviors and not
because they necessarily engaged in more suspicious behaviors than
White individuals.  Furthermore, giving officers license to engage in
pretext stops encourages officers to act on their racial hunches based
upon highly ambiguous evidence, which increases the influence of un-
conscious racial bias on their judgments.  If anything, more evidence
of criminality should be required before allowing officers to conduct
seizures to investigate potential wrongdoing.59  This is because, al-
though implicit biases are ubiquitous, studies demonstrate that gather-
ing more information can reduce the biases’ effects on behaviors and
judgments.60  In sum, although Chin and Vernon’s reasons for defend-
ing pretext may be purely instrumental, ultimately pretext stops will
continue to exacerbate race-based policing even when conscious bias
is absent.
II. PERPETRATOR PERSPECTIVE
Under the Court’s existing doctrine, racial discrimination claims
fail without proof of malicious racial motives.61  Thus, the Court’s race
jurisprudence only recognizes the harm of racial discrimination when
perpetrated by an intentionally racist actor.  Additionally, the Court
has not shown a willingness to embrace a different conception of race
discrimination.  This can explain why Chin and Vernon focus their ar-
guments against racial profiling on discovering officers’ subjective
motivations.
As Charles Lawrence astutely observed, however, the Court’s
“motive-centered inquiry, its requirement that we identify a perpetra-
tor, a bad guy wearing a white sheet and hood, ma[kes] no sense if
equality [is] our goal.”62  By arguing that the Court should allow in-
quiry into the subjective motivations of officers to determine if racial
animus motivated their pretextual traffic stops, Chin and Vernon im-
plicitly adopt the “perpetrator perspective.”63  The problem with the
59 For an in-depth discussion of this point, see Richardson, supra note 40, at 2075–83. R
60 See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine & Lindsay B. Sharp, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyp-
ing and Prejudice, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION 61, 72
(Todd D. Nelson ed., 2009) (noting that gathering more individuating information can reduce
reliance on stereotypes).
61 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–42 (1976) (“[The Court’s] cases have not em-
braced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a
racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportion-
ate impact.”).
62 Lawrence, supra note 29, at 944. R
63 As Devon Carbado writes, “race potentially matters in the Fourth Amendment context
only when a case involves a ‘racially bad’ cop.  Police officers who cannot be so described are
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perpetrator perspective is that it misapprehends the harm of race
discrimination.
Because race discrimination can occur even in the absence of
conscious bigotry, this Response argues against limiting the remedy
for discrimination in law enforcement to those instances where a ra-
cially-motivated, bad actor can be discovered.  The absence of con-
scious animus does not eliminate the racial burdens of being the
victim of racial profiling.  The harm consists of the victim’s lost sense
of security and privacy as well as the humiliation of being a constant
target of police enforcement activity.64  These harms exist indepen-
dently of an officer’s conscious motives.  Thus, as Devon Carbado ob-
serves, the “victim’s perspective . . . is less concerned with whether
police officers are racially blameworthy or racially culpable in the ‘bad
cop’ sense” and, as a result, “provides a more complete understanding
of the harms of race-based policing.”65
Furthermore, because racial discrimination claims are not cogni-
zable in the absence of a malicious actor,66 the perpetrator perspective
is even more pernicious.  It allows police departments to abdicate re-
sponsibility for discovering and addressing the institutional and struc-
tural practices that unevenly distribute the burdens of policing
amongst individuals of color even in the absence of conscious racial
animus.  In this way, the perpetrator perspective supports racial
subordination.67
CONCLUSION
Despite my disagreement with Chin and Vernon’s argument that
pretextual policing is justifiable and my discomfort with their adoption
presumed to be ‘racially good,’ and their racial interactions with people on the street are pre-
sumed to be constitutional.”  Carbado, supra note 3, at 968–69 (footnote omitted). R
64 The perspective of many Black victims is that traffic stops are “a systematic, humiliat-
ing, and often frightening form of police harassment.”  Sklansky, supra note 29, at 312; see also R
Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2355 (2002) (stating that racial profiling “arguably ha[s] the effect of
reducing [minority] groups’ social status and increasing their sense of isolation from the broader
American political community”).
65 Carbado, supra note 3, at 970. R
66 Lawrence, supra note 29, at 946. R
67 Speaking about the equal protection clause, Professor Charles Lawrence recognized
that the search for a bad actor means that when none exists, none of us have a responsibility for
creating a remedy for racial discrimination, no matter what form it takes.  As he writes, “The rest
of us [are] held guiltless as well, all of us exculpated from any responsibility for society’s institu-
tional and structural racism, because no intentional racist planned the unequal result.  While
blacks continue[ ] to suffer from conditions of inequality, none of us [are] to blame.” Id. at
946–47.
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of the perpetrator perspective, it is difficult to fault Chin and Vernon
for making these choices.  Although they provide the Court with mul-
tiple ways to reverse Whren’s problematic dicta that race discrimina-
tion is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the path of least
resistance is for the Court to excise the problematic dicta while leav-
ing the remainder of Whren undisturbed.68  Thus, their reasons for en-
dorsing pretext and the perpetrator perspective are understandable.
If Chin and Vernon’s arguments are able to convince the Court to
create a bright-line rule that race discrimination is unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, this will be a seminal achievement for a num-
ber of reasons.  First, it would send a strong message to the police that
racial profiling is wrong.  Not only may this limit police departments’
overt and subtle encouragement of racial profiling,69 but it also may
facilitate the ability of progressive police management to implement
programmatic changes to reduce racial disparities in policing.  The de-
cision would provide them with a mandate and thus some cover, espe-
cially with recalcitrant unions and officers, because they will be able to
argue that their proposed changes are required in the face of a Su-
preme Court decision.  It might also empower sergeants and patrol
officers to speak out when they witness officers engaged in racial pro-
filing.  Second, allowing inquiry into officers’ subjective motivations at
suppression hearings would finally make race claims cognizable under
the Fourth Amendment.70
In sum, in their groundbreaking and persuasive article, Chin and
Vernon provide powerful arguments for how the Court can overrule
its problematic Whren dicta.  It is true that under their framework,
racial discrimination would still be difficult to prove.  Chin and
Vernon forcefully insist, however, that Whren’s doctrinal endorsement
of race discrimination must be remedied nonetheless.  As they write,
“Whren is in many ways the Plessy of its era.  It endorsed racial dis-
crimination, and thereby encouraged its spread.”71  In fact, they main-
tain that Whren is even more egregious than Plessy because “[t]he
68 Chin & Vernon, supra note 4, at 942. R
69 Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land:
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious
Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1007 (2010) (noting that Whren “made legal challenges to profil-
ing more, not less, difficult, thereby implicitly encouraging police officers to rely on racial
profiles in law enforcement”).
70 For a discussion of this point, see Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective
Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559,
560 (1998).
71 Chin & Vernon, supra note 4, at 941. R
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Court could have reached the same outcome with pretext searches or
arrests, while saying that racial discrimination was prohibited.”72
The Court’s current conception of race discrimination is anemic
and in urgent need of reform.  The doctrine must move beyond its
focus on discovering a bad racial actor and begin to address the insti-
tutional and structural inequities that continue to plague policing re-
gardless of an officer’s conscious and unconscious motives.  By
working within the Court’s existing doctrine to support their argu-
ments, Chin and Vernon increase the likelihood that the Court will
condemn race discrimination as unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.  This would be an incredible achievement and an impor-
tant first step towards moving the Court to adopt a more realistic and
broader conception of the harms of race discrimination.
72 Id.
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